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    Abstract 
    The research objectives aim to analyze the advantages and the disadvantages of the fiscal 
federalism, in order to identify the model of economic governance that will increase the quality and 
efficiency  in  public  intervention.  The  fiscal  federalism  could  have  an  important  impact  on  the 
economic  and  political  level  in  EU,  but  mostly  in  member  states,  in  order  to  obtain  a  better 
administration and more responsible governance for the resources allocation, income distribution and 
fiscal  consolidation.  Fiscal  federalism  can  bring  to  Romania  advantages  towards  accessing  more 
European funds and achieving budgetary discipline, and the last but not the least for stimulating 
economic growth. 
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Introduction 
  The integration of the  new member states  from  Central  and Eastern  Europe have 
changed  the  whole  architecture  of  the  European  Union,  creating  pressure  for  a  deeper 
economic integration. In the context of the recent financial crisis, the EU member states have 
faced the difficult decisions of reducing budget deficits, mainly by cutting budget expenses to 
achieve fiscal consolidation. The National Bank of Romania’s governor, Mugur Isărescu has 
recently emphasized: "the recent international crisis amplified the need for deep reforms of 
economic governance, both at European and global level". The opinion of the governor of the 
National Bank of Romania is that “a good economic governance in the EU can be achieved 
through five main pillars: fiscal discipline, economic surveillance, close coordination, solid 
legal  framework  for  crisis  management,  strong  institutions  and  regulations  in  decisions 
making process”.
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  The "EU Sustainable Development Strategy" analyzes and underlines that the goal of 
“good  governance" is  to  promote the convergence of local,  regional,  national  and global 
levels,  in  order  to  enhance  their  contribution  to  sustainable  development.  Five  principles 
underlying the good governance are set out in the White Paper of the European Governance 
(COM  2001/428),  namely:  openness,  participation,  accountability,  effectiveness  and 
cohesion. Each principle is important and is the basis of democracy and the rule of law in 
member states, and they apply to all government levels: European, national, regional and 
local levels. Community governance principles are particularly important in order to respond 
to current challenges of the extended European Union. 
                                                           
* The article is based on author research study, which has been a part of  the IEM’s Study plan 2013, with 
theme: The EU Economic Governance Reform: Banking Union and Fiscal Union, coordinated by Dr. Petre 
Prisecaru, under the Priority program of the Romanian Academy: Romanian Economy and the Euro System. 
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  The  governance encompasses a much broader scope and reflects  the customs  and 
rules  by  which  a  country  authority    is  exercised.  This  includes  the  process  of  selection, 
monitoring  and  replacement  of  the  governments,  the  government's  ability  to  formulate 
responsibly  and  to  implement  effectively  sustainable  public  policies  and  the  level  of 
development  of  the  public  institutions  that  govern  economic  and  social  life  and  their 
interaction (World Bank, 2012).
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  The economic and financial crisis has revealed a number of weaknesses in the 
economic governance of the EU Economic and Monetary Union. The cornerstone is the new 
set  of  rules  on  strengthening  EU  economic  gover nance.  According  to  the  European 
Commission, the four main components of the „the economic governance", are the following: 
1.  Stronger preventive action by strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact and deeper 
fiscal coordination; 
2.  Corrective measures strengthened by reinforced Stability and Growth Pact; 
3.  Minimum requirements for the national budgets to be consistent with the minimum 
standards of quality and covers all levels of government; 
4.  The  prevention  and  the  correction  of  the  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  the 
stimulation  of  the  competitiveness  are  essential  factors.  New  "macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure" broadens the EU economic governance and the surveillance 
trends include macroeconomic developments. 
The  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and  Governance  in  the  Economic  and 
Monetary Union (known as the "fiscal compact"), which entered into force on 1 January 
2013, was an important step towards ensuring good economic governance of the EU. The 
Treaty  specifically  states  the  main  objective  of  strengthening  the  economic  pillar  of  the 
Economic and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules, which aim to foster budgetary 
discipline through a fiscal compact, strengthen economic policy coordination and improving 
governance in the Euro zone, thus supporting European Union's objectives for sustainable 
growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.
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         1. Defining the concept of fiscal federalism: advantages versus disadvantages 
In his "Essay on Fiscal Federalism", Wallace E. Oates considers the fiscal federalism 
as a form of fiscal decentralization and as a means of improving public sector performance. 
Federalism  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  the  central  government  and  national 
governments. The classical theory of fiscal federalism is concerned to establish a framework 
for the various forms of government functions and to create the instruments to perform these 
functions (Oates, 1999). 
    Later,  Wallace  E.  Oates  (2002)  questions  the  clarity  of  terminology  "fiscal 
federalism".  Thus,  Oates  (2002)  shows  that  for  those  who  are  not  economists,  the  term 
suggests a rather narrow area of fiscal relations (or purely financial) between different levels 
of government. Nevertheless, Oates’s view on fiscal federalism is that the area of application 
is  much  broader  than  the  fiscal  one,  and  focuses  on  the  roles  of  the  different  levels  of 
government, and includes both the fiscal and regulatory functions and the purely political 
governance  tools.  Therefore,  Oates  (2002)  defines  the  fiscal  federalism  as  "multi-level 
governance economy”. 
    It  is  noteworthy  that  the  multi-level  governance  has  been  developed  in  many 
theoretical studies of the EU policies and then expanded in the decision making process at 
EU level. The multi-level governance is the typical model of European governance and the 
                                                           
3 World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
4 http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/fiscal-compact-enters-into-force-on-1-january-
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most appropriate to European realities of contemporary society, considered by many experts. 
The multi-level governance framework bases on a clear understanding of the role of decision-
making process and the complex interactions of all actors in the political governance and 
focuses on power relations between different levels of government in the EU. 
Chanchal  Kumar  Sharma  (2004)  distinguishes  and  clarifies  that  while  the  fiscal 
federalism constitutes a set of guiding principles, a guiding concept that helps in designing 
financial relations between both national and local levels of the state, on the other hand fiscal 
decentralization  means  the  application  of  these  principles.  Subsequently,  Sharma  (2011) 
points out the fiscal federalism complexity and includes in his analysis both the vertical fiscal 
and  the  horizontal  relations.  In  his  opinion,  the  areas  closely  related  to  horizontal  fiscal 
relations are the regional imbalances and the competition. Similarly, the issues related to 
vertical fiscal relations show the fiscal imbalance "between the two levels of government, 
central and local authorities, respectively”.  
According to the macroeconomics theory, fiscal federalism can be effective in solving 
the problems that governments face today, such as: income distribution, resource allocation, 
and economic stability. Due to its flexibility the central government can foster the economic 
stability  and  the  income  distribution,  but  the  allocation  of  resources  should  be  the 
responsibility of the local or regional governments. However, as regions and cities are not 
equal in their income, it is necessary the intervention of central government. The benefits of 
the fiscal decentralization are the following: respecting the regional and local differences, low 
planning and administrative costs, stimulation of the competition between local authorities, 
encouragement of organizational and political innovations and promotion of effective public 
policies, because the citizens have more influence locally. However, the disadvantages of 
fiscal federalism are the lack of qualified personnel available locally and the lack of adequate 
public infrastructure locally (Encyclopedia Britannica). 
  
Figure 1: The advantages versus disadvantages of fiscal federalism 
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Source: Made by Author after Encyclopedia Britannica 
 
Professor David A. Super (2005) states that relations between the central and local 
taxes and the public spending programs are becoming increasingly controversial, and the 
fiscal federalism, a concept designed to divide the regulatory authority between the levels of 
government,  is  facing  issues  of  fiscal  cooperation.  Some  financing  programs  even  offer 
incentives for states to follow the central political leadership, and in other states the central 
government assumes financial responsibility because of its superior fiscal capacity. 
Super (2005) points out that a number of fiscal federalism vulnerabilities are related to 
either the consistently decrease of the impact of macroeconomic policies of the government 
to stimulate the economy expansion in periods of recession, or inadequate local funding for 
the social programs. Consequently, Super (2005) in his article „Rethinking fiscal federalism 
", criticizes the recent initiatives of decentralization of the fiscal responsibility for some types 
of  functions  such  as  the  finance  of  the  social  protection  programs.  The  author  asks  the 
countries to update their fiscal rules to eliminate inappropriate solutions to business cycle 
phases and to equip themselves with appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out the duties 
of collecting taxes, for establishing priorities and for allocating resources efficiently. 
 
2. Fiscal Federalism in the European Union 
  Oates (2002) points out that fiscal federalism explores the assignment of functions to 
different  levels  of  government,  and  the  design  of  the  tax  system  and  intergovernmental 
grants. Oates (2002) shows that in the EU, the assignment of the functions takes into account 
the Member States as modern nation states. However, at EU level it is required a strong 
central  government  with  expanded  monetary,  fiscal  and  regulatory  powers.  Under  these 
circumstances, Oates notes critically that these developments do not seem to fit very well 
with some elements of an „emerging confederation ", which represent the European Union. 
Oates (2002) relates to Picciotto and Weisner (1998), which showed that in addition to 
an appropriate division of functions between the different levels of government, providing a 
high level of performance of the public sector, it is needed the design and the establishment 
of  a  set  of  fiscal  institutions  and  regulators.  This  can  provide  the  right  incentives  to 
implement various types of public decisions. In addition, Oates (2002) accepts McKinnon’s 
idea  (1997),  that  it  is  necessary  to  have  "precise  budgetary  constraints"  at  all  levels  of 
government, especially at decentralized level. Furthermore, Oates (2002) criticizes a number 
of worldwide attempts of fiscal decentralization, which have often been affected by central 
fiscal institutions, that have provided effective fiscal bailouts for their politicians from the 
regional and local level.  
In short, according to Oates (2002), the fiscal decentralization cannot be achieved 
simply by allocating funds to the existing or newly formed, regional and local authorities but 
through appropriate procedures and institutions that should provide fiscal discipline in a way, 
that encourages effective budgetary decisions. 
  Sbragia (2004) states that for the review of  "the federal characteristics of Union" the 
researchers focus on the institutions and areas of policy which relate to the former first pillar 
of the EU, which included: the Common Agricultural Policy, the customs union and the 
internal  market,  the  competition  policy  and  the  state  subsidies,  the  structural  policy,  the 
commercial  policy,  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  the  European  citizenship,  the 
education and culture, the research and environment, the trans-European networks, the health, 
the consumer protection, the social policy, the Common Immigration Policy,  the asylum 
policy, the border protection. 
On the other hand, the former second Pillar, which concerned the common foreign 
and security policy, and the former third Pillar, which covered police and judicial cooperation 29 
 
in criminal matters, showed the characteristics of a confederation based on intergovernmental 
principles. Therefore, Sbragia (2004) sees the EU as a "semi federal” political entity. In his 
view,  the  existence  of  a  common  trade  on  policy  and  a  monetary  policy  underpin  the 
argument that the development of the European Union may be compared with the type of 
existing federations and post Maastricht EU has developed into a species of a federal state.  
According to the views of Boerzel & Hosli (2002), the economic theory of federalism, 
and  more  specifically  of  the  fiscal  federalism,  has  been  promoted  the  useful  theoretical 
concepts  in  order  to  evaluate  the  allocation  of  policy  competences  at  different  levels  of 
government, and the final purpose of this approach is to determine a normative-analytical 
“optimum  ".  The  optimal  structure  of  the  public  sector  concerns  the  allocation  of 
competences and fiscal powers at different levels of government, effectively. Under these 
approaches,  there seems to  be a consensus  that  the EU macroeconomic stabilization and 
distribution functions perform better at the central level, but the provision of the public goods 
is generally more effective at other levels of government.    
The  approach  of  the  political  aspects  of  federalism  is  based  on  the  economic 
reasoning  of  the  efficient  allocation  of  political  powers  between  different  levels  of 
government.  From  the  politico-economic  analysis,  it  appears  that  not  only  the  efficiency 
considerations, but also by political factors such as electoral dynamics determine the degree 
of  centralization  and  fiscal  decentralization.  Moreover,  in  recent  literature,  are  clear 
references to compromise between the economic efficiency and the political participation and 
the last, but not the least, the political representation issues and balancing the territorial and 
functional interests. Therefore, the most profitable approach is to combine economic with the 
political reasoning to the study of federalism, which can be helpful to analyze the current 
system of multi- level governance in the EU (Boerzel & Hosli, 2002). 
 
    3. The role of federalism as main instrument of the good governance   
   Valentin  Lazea,  chief  economist  of  the  National  Bank  of  Romania,  believes  that 
fiscal federalism, highlighted by the Treaty on Stability and Coordination in the Economic 
and Monetary Union, will bring to Romania three advantages: the quasi-free European funds, 
the monetary discipline and the maximization of the projection of a small economy on global 
level.
5  
Ferrara (2010) points out that the EU institutional structure influences the behavior of 
administrators at EU level and that of the  national and regional authorities, the costs and 
benefits of the regulations, respectively the expenses and the revenues of the public service 
providers. According to Ferrara (2010), the first justification of a need to create an institution 
links closely to its ability to spend the funds allocated. Secondly, at EU level the cohesion 
policy is planned multi-annually, but the EU budget is made and approved on an annual 
basis, given that the funds are assigned for every Member State for each year of the planning 
period. In case of the existence of the multiple levels of government, it increases the 
possibility of misallocation, given that both the national government level and the regional 
level  may  overestimate  their  needs  only  to  receive  a  larger  share  of  E uropean  funds. 
Subsequently, the mismanagement of the funds allocated inefficiently, can subsequently 
affect the decisions of the EU for the future allocation of funds. This has often led to a 
situation where some Member States were net beneficiaries of EU   funds. Under these 
circumstances, it is not enough to apply the principles of fiscal federalism and make the best 
use of the European funds, what it counts more is the quality of the governance of national 
and local authorities, which have to use the expertise of their employees and other specialists 
                                                           
5 Valentin Lazea (2012), Declaration from a scientific debate on EU Fiscal Treaty, organized by the Romanian 
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for evaluating and planning properly the projects funded by EU, and to effectively manage 
and spend the allocated funds. In this sense, we may say that attracting and management of 
the EU funds should be based on good multi-level governance at all levels: EU, Member 
States, regions, local authorities. 
Promoting the fiscal federalism as a form of fiscal decentralization can clearly bring 
benefits  in  terms  of  the  public  policy  optimization.  A  corollary  of  the  theory  of  fiscal 
federalism is that decentralization is likely to encourage constantly the efficiency through 
increased  competition  between  the  local  authorities  (King,  1984).  In  this  regard,  many 
scholars regard the decentralization as a paradigm for complex development and stimulating 
economic growth.  
Many  analysts  see  the  decentralization,  of  any  economic  and  social  sector,  as  an 
answer to the problems of the centralized systems. Government decentralization, which is the 
most studied subject, is regarded as a solution to problems such as: the economic decline, the 
government's  inability  to  fund  public  services  and  to  the  decline  in  the  performance  of 
overloaded services, the weak legitimacy of politicians in face of public opinion and the 
global  pressures  on  countries  with  inefficient  systems  (Holger,  2007).  Government 
decentralization refers to the restructuring or the reorganization of the authority, so that it will 
prevail  a  system  of  co-responsibility  between  institutions  involved  in  governance  at  the 
central,  regional  and  local  levels,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  thus 
increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the  governance, while augmenting the 
authority and capacity of the sub-national levels (UNDP, 1999).  
Of  all  the  components  of  decentralization,  the  fiscal  component  has  a  special 
significance because the regulation of intergovernmental fiscal relations can find the right 
balance between the different objectives at each level and may resolve tensions between them 
(Sharma, 2005). Chanchal Kumar Sharma (2005) notes that fiscal decentralization success 
depends on the design of the used instruments. These include designing a mix of economic, 
financial and administrative policies, adequate sequencing and timing, providing a sustained 
pace of tax reform, balancing contrasting forces of centralization and decentralization. There 
is no single answer to the complex problems of decentralization and that is why is necessary 
to consider the specific conditions of each municipality. 
Bl￶chliger & Vammalle (2012) pointed out that fiscal federalism and fiscal reform is 
a  mixture  of  structural  reforms,  including  fiscal  consolidation  and  reform  of  the  public 
administration. In their view, the fiscal reform has a number of features: 
  ● Major tax reforms should be made by national governments and local authorities, 
rather  than  by  interest  groups  that  are  outside  the  public  sphere.  As  a  result,  the  whole 
economy and society should benefit from the tax reforms, but in reality, the costs and benefits 
are unevenly distributed, and some individuals and groups may be the main payers, especially 
on short term. 
   ● It is necessary to evaluate the impact of the fiscal relations reforms, especially on 
short term. The governments and the administrations are often required to quantify the short-
term effects with high accuracy and the winners and losers of these measures, in order to 
have the exact idea of how the fiscal reforms, intergovernmental grants or tax rules affect 
certain categories of population and/or companies. 
   ● Fiscal federalism reforms tend to be a “zero sum game” in the short term, if one 
level of government will lose and the other will win. Asymmetry between winners and losers 
in the reform process and the uncertainty about the size and distribution of future benefits 
could weaken the support for fiscal reform. 
According to OECD experts, the fiscal consolidation plans have been an important 
step  towards  the  identification  of  the  areas  of  savings  and  reduction  of  the  government 
spending, but did not go far enough for a number of countries to achieve fiscal sustainability. 31 
 
Policy makers face a real dilemma when designing and implementing such plans, so while 
there is broad support for fiscal consolidation, the resistance occurs when proposing specific 
expenses cuts or revenue increases by tax growth. While health care spends a large portion of 
the government resources, the reform in this area cannot generate enough savings to balance 
public  budgets.  On  the  other  hand,  the  infrastructure  is  a  relatively  small  part  of  the 
government  spending,  but  many  countries  are  considering  this  in  spending  cuts.  While 
protecting the education field from the expenses cuts may be important to ensure the future 
development  of  any  country,  the  extended  need  for  fiscal  consolidation  makes  urgently 
necessary the reductions in some countries. 
A strategic approach can help governments to identify when and where is necessary to 
have fiscal reforms. The “strategic perspective” is the ability to understand and to balance the 
government values, the social preferences, the current and future costs and benefits, as well 
as the expertise and the analysis, and to use this knowledge to plan coherently, to define the 
objectives, to make decisions and to determine priorities. “Strategic perspective” bases on the 
risk assessment and management, and incorporates decisions based on clear evidence of the 
policy development and implementation (OECD, 2011b) 
 
  Conclusions  
  The  federalism  is  as  a  solution  to  many  theorists  for  institutional  innovation, 
efficiency,  freedom,  local  autonomy,  but  still  allows  distortions  in  subunits  (regions),  in 
apparent  conflict  with  the  central  normative  egalitarianism  (Follesdal,  2001).  The  fiscal 
federalism may affect the intensification of the inequalities in the regional development, due 
to differences in the tax collection, the fundraising processes and the management of financial 
resources. 
  The practical lesson is that a system with several levels of public finances requires a 
form of vertical transfer from the federal government to the poor regions/states, and a form of 
horizontal  transfer  from  the  rich  regions/states  to  the  poor  ones  (Montana,  2013).  In 
Montani‘s (2013) opinion the European fiscal deficit is one of the characteristics of European 
democratic deficit and is impossible to escape from the fiscal deficit, without getting rid of 
the second and vice versa. This means that in order to overcome the European fiscal deficit, is 
required a political struggle for full political integration of all member states.  
In the study entitled "Europe for Growth: For a Radical Change in the EU", Haug, 
Lamassoure  &  Verhofstadt  (2011),  examine  the  shortcomings  of  the  EU  budget  and  the 
crucial issue of its size. The authors underline that the EU budget amounts to 1% of the gross 
national income, which is an amount that has remained modest and stable in the past decade, 
although the scope of its activities has expanded considerably in the recent years. In the year 
2011, it was set at 126.5 billion Euros in payments (141 billion Euros in commitments).  
EU could have a bigger federal budget if the European states and their leaders are able 
to  convince  people  that  some  public  goods  (balanced  growth,  full  employment,  green 
economy, security) can be provided by the federal government at a smaller costs, than paying 
for the same public goods (or the illusion of such public goods) provided by their national 
governments (Haug, Lamassoure & Verhofstadt, 2011). A fiscal federal system at EU level in 
the form of fiscal union can reduce the average tax burden of European citizens. 
  The mentioned above study findings refer to the potential economies of its member 
states and the EU, which could benefit from simplification of the EU funds procedures, which 
are  currently  scattered  in  different  instruments  and/or  formulas,  as  well  from  a  greater 
synergy between the European and national policies and budgets. The authors showed that 
during the crisis, characterized by a scarcity of the financial resources, there is an urgent need 
to coordinate the economic recovery of the EU member states and to create incentives for 
significant investments. These will sustain the economic growth, which is very necessary to 32 
 
meet emerging needs in the EU new member states in order to meet the challenges of the 
future.  
Consequently, "the good economic governance" has two major components: a good 
management of the existing financial resources at central and local levels, and the promotion 
of the sustained measures in order to identify the new funding, the new budget revenues, 
through enhancing the investments, the business environment and the economic growth. 
   
References 
  Boerzel, T. & Hosli, M., 2002, Brussels between Bern and Berlin: Comparative Federalism meets the 
European Union. Working Paper Political Sciences 2/2002, Universitatea Vrije, Amsterdam, ISSN 
1569- 3546. 
  Blöchliger, H. & Vammalle, C., 2012, Reforming Fiscal Federalism and Local Government: Beyond 
the Zero-Sum Game, OECD Fiscal Federalism Studies, OECD Publishing, ISBN 978-92-64-09841-1  
  Claeys, P., Ramos, R. & Suriñach, J., 2008, Fiscal sustainability across government tiers. Springer-
Verlag. IEEP (2008) 5:139–163. 
  Ferrara, A., 2010, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Multi-Level Government: The Case of EU Cohesion Policy 
and US Federal Investment Policies. Routledge Studies in the modern World Economy. London and 
New York. 
  Follesdal,  A.  ,  2001),  Federal  Inequality  Among  Equals,  Arena  Working  Papers  01/8,  Centre  for 
European Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences. Oslo.   
  King, D. (1984). Fiscal Tiers: The Economics of Multilevel Government. London: George Allen and 
Unwin. 
  Junghun,  K.  &  Vammalle,  C.  (2012).  Institutional  and  Financial  Relations  across  Levels  of 
Government, OCDE Fiscal federalism Studies- KIPF, OECD Publishing, ISBN 978-92-64-16689-9.  
  Holger, D. (2007). School Decentralization in the Context of Globalizing Governance: International 
Comparison of Grassroots Responses, Springer, p. 28-29, ISBN 1402047002, 9781402047008. 
  Haug,  J.,  Lamassoure,  A.,  Verhofstadt,  G.  (2011).  Europe  for  growth:  for  a  radical  change  in 
financing the EU., CEPS Paperbacks, ISBN 978-94-6138-085-2. 
  McKinnon, R. (1997). Market-Preserving Fiscal Federalism in the American Monetary Union in M. 
Blejer and T. Ter-Minassian, eds., Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance: Essays in Honor of 
Vito Tanzi. London: Routledge, 73-93.  
  Montani, G. (2013). Fiscal Federalism for a new Europe. University Union of European Federalist. 
http://www.federalists.eu/uef/news/fiscal-federalism-for-a-new-Europe. 
  Oates, W.E. (1999). An Essay on Fiscal federalism. Journal of economic Literature, 37(3):1120-49. 
  Oates, W.E. (2002). Fiscal Federalism and European Union: Some Reflections. Conference ”Il futuro 
dei sistemi di welfare nazionali tra integrazione europea e decentramento regionale, coordinamento, 
competizione, mobilit￠, Pavia Universit￠. 
  Olsen, Johan, P. (2000). How, then, does one get there?, An institutionalist response to Herr Fischer´s 
vision of a European Federation Arena Working Papers 00/22. Centre for European Studies, Faculty of 
Social Sciences, Oslo. 
  Picciotto, R., and E. Wiesner, eds. (1998). Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.  
  Sharma, Chanchal K. (2005). When Does decentralization deliver? The Dilemma of Design. South 
Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies 6 (1):38-45, 2005a.  
  Sharma, Chanchal K. (2005). The Federal Approach to Fiscal Decentralization: Conceptual Contours 
for Policy Makers'. Loyola Journal of Social Sciences, XIX(2):169-88. 
  Sharma,  Chanchal  K.  (2011).  Beyond  Gaps  and  Imbalances:  re-structuring  the  debate  on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. Public Administration. Vol. 90.  33 
 
  Super, David, A.  (2005). Rethinking Fiscal Federalism. Harvard Law Review, v. 118, no. 8, iunie 
2005, p. 2544-2652. 
  Sbragia, Alberta (2004). The Future of Federalism in the European Union. European Community 
Studies  Association  Canada  (ECSA-C)  2004,  Biennial  Conference  "A  Constitution  for  Europe? 
Governance and Policy Making in the European Union". Montreal. 
  IMF  (1997).  Good  governance,  IMF’s  role.  Washington,  D.C:  International  Monetary  Fund 
Publication Services, SBN 1-55775-690-2. 
  IMF (2007). Manual on Fiscal Transparency. Washington DC, Glossary 
  OCDE (2011a.), Making the Most of Public Investment in a Tight Fiscal Environment: Multi-level 
Governance  Lessons  from  the  Crisis,  Paris:  OECD  Publishing, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264114470 
  OCDE  (2011b.),  Fiscal  Consolidation:  The  Need  for  Evidence-  Based  Decision  Making,  in 
Government at a Glance 2011. Paris: OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2011-6-
en 
  United Nations Development Program (1999). Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions, p. 2, 16, 
26. 
 
Web sites 
- http://www.britannica.com 
- EU, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=com:2001:0428:fin:en:pdf 
- World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
- UN, http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance 
- UN,  http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp